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19.5.13

22/05 - Tony Marmo


Crispness, Consistency, Necessity...

Sylvain Bromberger has proposed– in more complicate manner than it can be spelt out herein– that in order to understand rational thinking one should firstly consider how questions are selected, namely what makes them distinctive to be admissible as objects of our explanation. The distinctiveness of the questions is arguably based on cognitive constraints rather than on the nature of the subjects. If this is correct, the discovery of the logic operators, regardless of the different they belong to, traces its roots not to the subjects they may apply but to a pre-existent rationality. Thus, for instance, the difference of a crisp concept and fuzzy one is not rooted on the objects one examines, which could, by their very nature, be described fuzzily or crisply, but on the natural way the human mind deals with different objects.
Here we propose a debate on whether the different logic and philosophical notions of crispness and consistency of objects should be treated as equivalent, inasmuch as one can select roughly the same cluster of questions. Maybe crispness is more suitable to explain consistency than necessity.

Observação: O seminário será apresentado em português, se não houver convidado estrangeiro presente. 

Um comentário:

  1. MUDANÇA DE ASSUNTO

    Como me foi sugerido e pedido, deslocarei o assunto para uma apresentação da Filosofia da Ciência de Bromberger, que ainda é pouco conhecida no Brasil Eis o novo resumo:


    Paradigm Shifts and Issues in Modern Logic

    In the present work, we shall present and partially modify some aspects of Sylvain Bromberger’s theory of knowledge/ ignorance, and try to discuss some implications for the study of logic. (Cf. Bromberger 1990, 1992 and 1997). Bromberger has proposed that in order to understand rational thinking one should firstly consider how initial questions are selected, namely what makes them distinctive to be admissible as objects of our explanation. The distinctiveness of the questions is based on cognitive constraints rather than on the nature of the subjects. If this is correct, the discovery of the logic concepts, regardless of the different systems they belong to, traces its roots to a pre-existent rationality. One instance of this is the distinction between a crisp and fuzzy attributes in many-valued logics, which is due to the natural way the human mind describes and deals with different objects.

    Mudanças de Paradigma e Temas na Lógica Moderna

    No presente trabalho apresentaremos e modificaremos em parte alguns aspectos da teoria do conhecimento/ ignorância de Sylvain Bromberger, tentando discutir suas implicações para o estudo da lógica. (Cf. Bromberger 1990, 1992 and 1997) Propugna o referido autor que para entender o pensamento racional, deve-se primeiramente considerar como se escolhem questões iniciais, a saber, o que as torna distintivas para serem objetos de nossa explicação. Essa distinção se assente em restrições cognitivas e não na natureza das disciplinas. Se isto é correto, a descoberta de conceitos lógicos, independentemente dos sistemas a que pertencerem, têm raízes na própria racionalidade humana. Um exemplo disto é a distinção entre atributos nítidos e difusos nas lógicas multivalentes, a qual se deve ao modo da mente humana descrever e lidar com diferentes objetos.

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